Three Essays on Equilibrium Selection in Games

Three Essays on Equilibrium Selection in Games
Author :
Publisher :
Total Pages : 188
Release :
ISBN-10 : OCLC:35185614
ISBN-13 :
Rating : 4/5 ( Downloads)

Book Synopsis Three Essays on Equilibrium Selection in Games by : Jeong Hun Oh

Download or read book Three Essays on Equilibrium Selection in Games written by Jeong Hun Oh and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 188 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:


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(Cont.) The second chapter investigates the interaction of strategic uncertainty and timing in a coordination game. Carlsson and van Damme have shown that small