Solutions for Cooperative Fuzzy Games and Their Application in Exchange Economies

Download or read book Solutions for Cooperative Fuzzy Games and Their Application in Exchange Economies written by and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis discusses solutions for cooperative games and exchange economies, giving special attention to fuzziness in these models. Starting with solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), we enrich the model by considering fuzzy payoffs in TU-games, and finally consider fuzzy preferences in a model of an exchange economy. In Chapter 2, we deal with the weighted excesses of players in cooperative games which are obtained by summing up all the weighted excesses of all coalitions to which they belong. We first show that lexicographically minimizing the individual weighted excesses of players gives the same minimal weighted excess for every player. Moreover, we show that the associated payoff vector is the corresponding least square value. Second, we show that minimizing the variance of the players' weighted excesses on the preimputation set, again yields the corresponding least square value. Third, we show that these results give rise to lower and upper bounds for the core payoff vectors. Using these bounds, we define the weighted super core as a polyhedron that contains the core, which is one of the main set-valued solutions for both cooperative games as well as exchange economies. It turns out that the least square values can be seen as a center of this weighted super core, giving a third new characterization of the least square values. Finally, these lower and upper bounds for the core inspire us to introduce a new solution for cooperative TU games that has a strong similarity with the Shapley value. In Chapter 3, we introduce a new approach to measure the dissatisfaction for coalitions of players in cooperative transferable utility games. This is done by considering affine (and convex) combinations of the classical excess and the proportional excess. Based on this so-called alpha-excess, we define new solution concepts for cooperative games, such as the alpha-prenucleolus and the alpha-prekernel.