ESSAYS ON THE U.S. PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE INDUSTRY

Download or read book ESSAYS ON THE U.S. PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE INDUSTRY written by Yingrui Lu and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 137 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation includes two chapters. In Chapter 1, "Information Risk and the Cost of Equity Capital Revisited: Evidence from the U.S. Property-Casualty Insurance Industry", I revisit the relationship between information risk and the cost of equity capital in the U.S. property-casualty (P-C) insurance industry. Eckles, Halek and Zhang (2014) find that information risk has no effect on the cost of equity using a sample of U.S. P-C insurers. Following their approach, we decompose information risk into innate and discretionary components. I find that innate information risk affects the cost of equity capital through two opposing channels. On the one hand, innate information risk directly increases an insurer's cost of equity capital by increasing investors' assessment of the riskiness of the insurer's future cash flows. On the other hand, innate information risk indirectly decreases the insurer's cost of equity capital by changing its production so that the assessed riskiness of the firm's future cash flows are reduced. This (negative) indirect effect depends on factors that influence the insurer's underwriting decisions. My empirical results provide supporting evidence for a significant, positive direct effect of innate information risk, while the magnitude of the (negative) indirect effect increases with the insurer's proportion of long-tail business and decreases with its affiliated reinsurance usage. As to the impact of discretionary information risk, my results are mixed. I also find that, on average, the overall effect of information risk on the cost of equity capital for property-casualty insurers is significant and negative. In Chapter 2, "Coordination of Capital, Earnings, and Taxes in the U.S. Property-Casualty Insurance Industry", I investigate how property-casualty (P-C) insurers manage discretionary tools to achieve regulatory capital, earnings, and tax planning goals. I examine one accrual tool, loss reserve errors, together with two real transaction tools: realized capital gains (losses) from investment sales, and capital contributions. I find that when P-C insurers have lower pre-managed capital levels, managers will report income-increasing loss reserve errors, recognize more realized capital gains and receive more capital contributions. When P-C insurers have lower pre-managed earnings, managers will report income-increasing loss reserve errors. When P-C insurers have higher marginal tax rates, managers will report income-decreasing loss reserve errors and recognize more realized capital losses. Moreover, I analyze the effect of ownership structures on the degree of managerial discretion for various reporting goals. My analysis includes three different types of ownership structures: public, private stock and mutual firms. I find that, through the use of capital contributions, public firms are more aggressive in capital management, while mutual firms are less aggressive in capital management than private stock firms. In terms of using the other two tools, compared to private stock firms, public firms do not manage capital less aggressively; they do not manage earnings more aggressively; they do not manage taxes less aggressively. Compared to private stock firms, mutual firms are less aggressive in capital management; they are more aggressive in earnings management; they are less aggressive in tax management.